在歷來對戴震義理的正反兩面評價中，筆者發見有一交會處，即在重視客觀現實與挺立道德主體之間，究竟如何架構出戴震認知的儒學義理。而本文透過戴震「理－禮」架構，正欲揭露為何重視客觀現實，且廓清客觀現實的義涵。最終指出二項訊息：一是，戴震未否定「理」，而且藉由「條理」串接「理－禮」，並直接關注「禮」。因為「禮」具備強烈的客觀現實意義，遂可消弭已悖離客觀現實的一己意見之理。人若能緊扣「禮」，其實也印證「理」。戴震對宋儒之理或「以理殺人」的質疑，目的即為揭示真正的「理」。要言之，「理－禮」承繼儒學的既有傳統元素，歸復古賢聖的人倫日用之實體實事上。二是，「理－禮」既是關注人倫日常之實體實事，若評論戴震所關注的客觀現實，乃脫離道德活動，甚至悖離人之道德能動性，顯然有待商榷。因為，論者或不認同「情」作為道德實踐的推動元素，但卻無法否認戴震對人之道德能動性，依舊緊扣在道德主體，只是此道德主體包含宋儒欲滅之「情」。換言之，戴震關注重心不在「理」，而是人如何透過「以情絜情」映顯出「理」，且「以情絜情」又指明人必然是群體之人，此即戴震「理－禮」架構的客觀現實義涵。

Scholars have had positive and negative comments on Dai Zhen’s theory in the past. This paper finds that there is a convergence point, that is, we should find a way to construct Dai Zhen’s Confucianism theory between objective reality and moral subject. Therefore, this article will use Dai Zhen’s Li (rule)-Li (norm) structure to expose how to pay attention to objective reality and clarify the meaning of objective reality. The conclusion of this paper contains two messages. First of all, Dai Zhen’s real thought of “Li (rule)” is not only that he does not want to deny “Li (rule)”, but he also wants to connect “Li(rule)-Li(norm)” through “principle”. He puts the focus directly on “Li (norm)” because “Li(norm)” has strong objective and practical significance. This can remove the Li (rule) form of personal opinion, because such Li (rule) has actually been separated from the objective reality. If a person can abide by “Li(norm)”, he will actually achieve “Li(rule)”. Because Dai Zhen wants to reveal the true “Li (rule)”, he questioned Li (rule) of Song Confucianism or “borrowing Li (rule) to kill people.” To put it bluntly, “Li(rule)-Li(norm)” inherits the traditional elements of Confucianism and returns the human ethics of the ancient sage to the actual things in daily life. Furthermore, because “Li(rule)-Li(norm)” is concerned with the actual things in daily life in human ethics. If anyone thinks that the objective reality that Dai Zhen is concerned about is away from moral activity, and even departs from the agency. There is obviously room for discussion in this statement. Perhaps some comments cannot agree that Qing (emotion) is the driving force of moral practice. But we can’t deny that the agency that Dai Zhen said is still closely related to the moral subject, but this moral subject also contains the Qing (emotion) that Song Confucianism wants to remove. In other words, Dai Zhen’s focus is not on “Li (rule)”, but on how people use “empathy” to prove “Li(rule)”, while empathy requires understanding not one person, but necessarily a group of people. This is the objective reality of Dai Zhen’s Li(rule)-Li(norm) Structure.